Blog

The Hidden Rift: Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE Are Fueling a Proxy War in Sudan

  • Post author:
  • Post category:History
Despite their image as close allies — Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) of Saudi Arabia and President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) of the UAE were once seen as partners in reshaping the Middle East — the two Gulf powers find themselves on opposing sides of Sudan’s brutal civil war. What began as a power struggle between Sudanese generals has evolved into a proxy contest that prolongs one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
 
The Sudanese Conflict in Brief
Sudan’s war erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). The fighting has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, triggered famine, and involved widespread atrocities, including allegations of genocide in Darfur.
 
Both sides have deep roots in Sudan’s authoritarian past, but the war is now sustained by external backers who see strategic value in the country’s Red Sea coastline, gold mines, agricultural land, and ports.
 
Diverging Interests in the Horn of Africa
Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially aligned in Sudan after Omar al-Bashir’s 2019 ouster. They provided billions in aid, supported the military’s role in the transition, and secured concessions (Sudanese troops fought in Yemen for the Gulf coalition; Sudan normalized ties with Israel). Both invested heavily in Sudanese agriculture, mining, and ports for food security and economic leverage.
 

Their approaches diverged as the war broke out:

  • UAE’s Strategy (Backing the RSF): The UAE has long cultivated ties with Hemedti and the RSF, which evolved from the Janjaweed militias. Reports from UN experts, journalists, and governments accuse Abu Dhabi of supplying weapons (including Chinese drones), funding, and logistical support via routes through Chad, Libya, and elsewhere. The UAE officially denies direct military involvement. Motivations include control over gold exports (much of Sudan’s gold flows to Dubai), access to Red Sea ports and farmland, and a preference for flexible, non-state proxies that allow rapid influence without relying on central governments. This fits the UAE’s broader pattern in the Horn of Africa and Libya of partnering with agile actors for economic footholds.
     
    Saudi Arabia’s Approach (Leaning Toward the SAF): Riyadh has provided diplomatic, financial, and some indirect military/political support to the SAF and Burhan. Saudi officials prioritize regional stability to protect Vision 2030 projects, Red Sea security, and investments. They view the RSF as too unpredictable and militia-like, preferring a conventional army as a partner for governance and border control. Saudi Arabia has mediated talks while increasingly countering UAE influence, including through ties with Egypt (a strong SAF backer).

     

Why Friends Became Rivals in Sudan

MBS and MBZ were once close, with the UAE supporting MBS’s rise. However, interests have clashed across multiple theaters (Yemen, economic competition, Red Sea influence). In Sudan, the rivalry boils down to:

  • Vision vs. Opportunism: Saudi Arabia seeks stable state institutions to minimize chaos near its borders. The UAE embraces riskier proxy relationships for quicker gains.
     
    hornreview.org
  • Resources and Geopolitics: Both covet Sudan’s assets, but through different vehicles. Prolonged conflict benefits short-term leverage but harms long-term stability.
  • Broader Gulf Competition: Sudan is one arena among several where the two powers vie for dominance as middle powers in a shifting global order.

This dynamic has turned Sudan into a powder keg. As long as the RSF receives external sustenance and the SAF gets enough backing to hold on, neither side feels compelled to compromise. Mediation efforts (including “Quad” talks involving Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and the US) have repeatedly stalled.

The Human Cost and Outlook

The proxy element exacerbates suffering: millions displaced, cities ruined, and atrocities continuing. International criticism of the UAE has grown, with some U.S. voices and lawmakers calling for pressure, while Saudi Arabia positions itself as a stabilizer.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remain partners on many issues, but Sudan reveals the limits of their “bromance.” Without coordinated de-escalation — or stronger external pressure — the war will grind on, with Sudanese civilians paying the price for Gulf ambitions in the Horn of Africa. The conflict underscores a broader truth: even close allies compete fiercely when strategic prizes like Red Sea access and African resources are at stake.

Does this make it unlikely that MBS & MBZ would join forces with the Americans against the IRGC?
No, the rivalry in Sudan does not make it unlikely. In fact, recent events (as of mid-2026) show the opposite: a direct Iranian threat has prompted Saudi Arabia and the UAE to coordinate — or at least align — against Iran and the IRGC, often in partnership with the US, despite their differences elsewhere.
 
Why Sudan Doesn’t Block Anti-Iran Cooperation
  • Existential threat vs. regional competition: Sudan is a secondary theater involving economic interests (ports, gold, farmland), proxies, and influence. Iran and the IRGC represent a core, direct security threat to both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi — through missiles, drones, proxies (e.g., Houthis), and potential nuclear breakout. When Iran attacked Gulf infrastructure and cities in early 2026, both countries faced real damage and responded with defensive coordination, base access for the US, and limited offensive actions.

Historical pattern: MBS and MBZ cooperated closely against Iran-backed forces in Yemen (2015 onward) even as other rivalries simmered. The GCC (including Saudi and the UAE) has a long track record of uniting on deterrence against Iran, backed by US security guarantees.

  • 2026 Iran war dynamics: Iran’s strikes hit the UAE hardest (thousands of projectiles) and Saudi Arabia to a lesser extent. In response:
    • Both allowed greater US access and conducted or supported retaliatory actions.
    • The UAE took a more aggressive stance (e.g., strikes on Iranian targets, closer Israel ties).
    • Saudi Arabia leaned more diplomatic but still supported coalition efforts and base usage.
       
      thesoufancenter.org
    • GCC solidarity held despite the feud — they condemned Iranian attacks jointly and prioritized defense.

Their approaches differ (UAE more hawkish and willing to confront; Saudi more focused on de-escalation and Vision 2030 stability), but this hasn’t prevented practical alignment against the shared foe.

Limits and Nuances

  • Not full military merger: They are unlikely to create a joint Saudi-UAE expeditionary force under US command. Cooperation is more about intelligence sharing, airspace/basing, air defense, and parallel actions than integrated operations. Rivalries (Sudan, Yemen, economic competition) create friction, and the UAE has sometimes acted more independently.
     
  • US role is key: American involvement (security umbrella, arms, intelligence) acts as the glue. Both MBS and MBZ value strong US ties for deterrence.
  • Post-ceasefire outlook: With a tenuous US-Iran ceasefire in place, both prioritize avoiding escalation while hedging. Direct IRGC aggression would likely pull them closer again.

Bottom line: Proxy rivalries like Sudan reveal competing ambitions, but they haven’t fractured the fundamental alignment against Iran. When the IRGC directly threatens their territory, economies, or Red Sea interests, self-preservation and shared threat perception take precedence. MBS and MBZ can compete in Africa while cooperating in the Gulf — it’s classic Middle East realpolitik. A major Iranian provocation would likely see them (and the US) on the same side again.

Published by Editor, Sammy Campbell.